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Abstract
Unlike in small communities where one can strategically interact with an-
other according to the latter's individual reputation, players in complex soci-
eties often have to interact with strangers whose individual reputations cannot
be easily acquired. They often have to infer their counterparts' characteristics
from the latters' group reputation to simplify decision making. We provide
a game theoretical model of reputation matching concerning corruption dur-
ing social transformation. We show that the regime change from acquaintance
matching to anonymous matching tends to cause rampant corruption and the
eectiveness of anti-corruption policies is non-monotonic with respect to the
supervision eorts.
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1 Introduction
Reputation matters not only when players want to establish long-term relationship
with others, but also in various one-shot interactions, policy makings, and institu-
tional setups.
The issue of individual reputation is well studied. Holmstrom (1999) investigates
the dynamic incentive problem { an agent has the strongest incentive to work hard
to reveal her managerial ability in the beginning. As time goes by, her ability is
learned, and thus the reputation eect on incentive also decreases. Kreps and Wilson
(1982), Milgrom and Roberts (1982), Fudenberg and Levine (1989), Ely, Fudenberg
and Levine (2008), and many others investigate the settings of a single long-run player
and a sequence of short-run opponents { the long-run player tries to commit to certain
type to achieve highest possible utility. Horner (2002) introduces competition to keep
high eorts sustainable.
However, players in complex societies often have to interact with strangers whose
individual reputations cannot be easily acquired. Unlike in small communities where
one can rather easily acquire another's individual reputation, they often have to in-
fer their counterparts' characteristics from the latter's group reputation to simplify
decision making. Cornell and Welch (1996) develop a model on \screening discrimina-
tion" based solely on \unfamiliarity," which makes it more dicult to make accurate
assessments. Fang (2001) shows that by allowing a rm to give preferential treat-
ment to workers based on some \cultural activity," a society can partially overcome
the informational free-riding problem. The critique on this statistical discrimination
theory is that it is a static theory, which discusses little about reputation formation
and its persistence. Diamond (1989) constructs a dynamic reputation model in debt
markets. His key point is that as time goes by, bad type drops out, which drives
up the reputation for the remaining agents. However, the focus is still on reputation
formation of the individual agents.
Tirole (1996) is the rst attempt to model the idea of group reputation as an ag-
gregate of individual reputations. Due to group pooling (individual players' unknown
ages and imperfect signals of players' history records), individual reputations relate
to group reputation; and the new members may suer from the original sin of their
elders. Levin (2009) adopts a similar idea that a player cannot be perfectly distin-
guished from her peers and argues that their past behaviors aect the player's record
of performance. Both papers focus on individual reputation and do not clarify the
dierence between individual reputation and group reputation. A major problem is
that for a large group, its group reputation can hardly be dramatically aected by the
behaviors of a small number of group members. Even worse, some group reputations
may be false stereotypes that have little to do with actual individual reputations.
We dene one's group reputation as others' beliefs on the characteristics of one's
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aliated group. In small communities, others usually acquire such beliefs partially
through rst-hand information about a substantial number of group members. In
complex societies, however, a group's reputation quite often disseminate among people
who have never been at the presence of any member of the group. It's not uncommon
that a player's individual reputation in a complex society is derived from her group
reputation by adding individual signals. Based on this denition, we construct a
model of group reputation formation and evolution, illustrated by a case in corruption,
to answer the following two questions: how does the transformation from community
to society aect reputation matching? What are the policy implications for regime
change of reputation matching? We show that the regime change from acquaintance
matching in small communities to anonymous matching in complex societies tends
to cause rampant corruption. The eectiveness of an anti-corruption policy is non-
monotonic with respect to the supervision eorts, which have to reach some long-term
minimum level to reverse high corruption. To be eective, anti-corruption measures
have to be taken on both lines of bribe taking and duty dereliction.
Our model is related to the literature of cooperation among strangers, which stud-
ies the repeated games with random matching of anonymous agents (e.g., Kandori
1992; Healy 2007; Camera and Casari 2009). Their theoretical models and exper-
imental designs focus on imperfect public monitoring and the agents' own private
monitoring. While in our model, we introduce external monitoring by a benevolent
government who regulates against corruption.
Our model is also related to the literature of evolutionary game theory. Since the
seminal paper by Maynard Smith and Price (1973), evolutionary dynamics of pop-
ulation games has been well studied in the area of evolutionary biology. However,
evolutionary dynamics in human societies rely on much more complicated microfoun-
dations than the genetically-determined strategies (Sandholm 2010). We characterize
the equilibrium and study the evolutionary dynamics in such an environment of ra-
tional decision makers.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the structure
of the model. Section 3 studies how the change of reputation matching matters
during the social transformation from community to society and presents our main
results. Section 4 investigates the policy implications for regime change of reputation
matching. Some comparative statics are discussed in section 5. Section 6 concludes.
2 The Model
2.1 Basic Conceptions
Bardhan's (1997) denition of corruption is applied as \the use of public oce for
private gains, where an ocial (the agent) entrusted with carrying out a task by
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the public (the principal) engages in some sort of malfeasance for private enrichment
which is dicult to monitor for the principal." We focus on two types of corruptive
behaviors, bribe acceptance and duty dereliction, of civil servants.
Suppose there exist a benevolent government, a group of civil servants, and a
population of private agents. The benevolent government selects and supervises civil
servants who examine and approve projects of the private agents by certain criteria,
such as road test for a driver's license. The civil servants are categorized into two
types: \bad" or \opportunist." The bad type always accepts bribes or intentionally
places obstacles during the tests if there is no bribe.1 The opportunist type will
weigh the advantages and disadvantages to decide whether or not to accept bribes,
or if there is no bribe whether or not to place obstacles during the tests .
We dene individual reputation and group reputation as follows:
A player Ai's individual reputation to doX with respect to some others
Pj is the belief of Pj on the type or behavior of Ai to do X.
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Group Gk's group reputation to do X with respect to Pj is the belief
of Pj on the distribution of behavioral types of players As 2 Gk, to whom
Pj does not have individual information, to do X.
According to this denition, we divide group Gk into two disjoint subgroups: play-
ers whom Pj is familiar with (Pj has additional individual signals on these players),
players whom Pj is not familiar with. For players belonging to the rst subgroup,
each player's individual reputation with respect to Pj may vary upon the individual
signals Pj has. But for players belonging to the second subgroup, each player's indi-
vidual reputation with respect to Pj is the same as the group reputation because Pj
does not have additional individual signals on these players.
We consider two dierent regimes of reputation matching and the change between
two regimes. Under anonymous matching, a potential briber does not know the
true type of her matching civil servant and therefore will decide whether or not to
oer a bribe according to the group reputation of the civil servants. Whereas under
acquaintance matching, a potential briber knows the true type of her matching
civil servant and therefore will decide whether or not to oer a bribe according to
the private reputation of the civil servant. The transformation from community to
society, as suggested by Tonnies (2001) and Cook and Hardin (2001), contributes
greatly for decision making during the regime change between two types of matching.
1Bertrand, Djankov, Hanna, and Mullainathan (2007) provide the evidence of bureaucrats arbi-
trarily failing driver's licence test takers for rent-seeking in India.
2According to Hardin (1993), trust is a three-part relationship: A trust B to do X. Similarly,
reputation is also a three-part relationship: B's reputation to do X with respect to A is A's belief
on the type or behavior of B to do X.
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2.2 Stage Game
Time is discrete, indexed by t, and the horizon is innite. At the beginning of each
period, there is a continuum of mass 1 civil servants, who are assigned to examine the
projects for some private agents. Each participating private agent decides whether or
not to oer a bribe to the civil servant who is randomly assigned. Then it is the civil
servant's turn to make a choice. There are two dierent scenarios depending on the
choice of the private agent: if there is a bribe, the civil servant will decide to either
reject or accept the bribe; if there is no bribe, the civil servant will decide to either
implement a fair test or intentionally place obstacles during the test. Thus, there are
two types of corruptive behaviors for the civil servants: bribe acceptance and duty
dereliction.
Let (; ) represent the xed amount of supervision eort level of the govern-
ment against these two types of corruptive behaviors, where  and  2 [0; 1]. I.e., if
there is a mass of  t civil servants accepting bribes in period t, then the probability
for each of them to be detected p;t = minf= t; 1g.3 Similarly, if there is a mass of
t civil servants placing obstacles during the tests in period t, then the probability
for each of them to be detected p;t = minf=t; 1g.4
Private agents are short lived. Each generation of short-run private agents plays
only in one period, and is replaced by another generation of short-run private agents in
the next period. The action set of the private agents is A1 = fB(ribe); N(ot bribe)g.
Civil servants, of \opportunist" type or \bad" type denoted as type \O" and \B"
respectively, are long lived with common discount factor  2 (0; 1).
The bad type \B" always accepts a bribe and implements a fair test if there is any
bribe or places obstacles during the test if there is no bribe. For the \opportunist"
type \O," if there is a bribe, she will implement a fair test and weigh the benets from
the bribe and the jeopardy of being caught by the government to decide whether or
not to accept the bribe. If there is no bribe, she will also implement a fair test. She
has no incentive to place obstacles at her own risk of being caught.5 Therefore, the
action set for the \opportunist" type \O" civil servants A2 = fA(ccept); R(eject)g.
Now we turn to the stage game payos, which are described in gure 1. At the
beginning of each period, each civil servant will be randomly assigned to examine the
project for a participating private agent. The private agent will choose to either bribe
3In this case, both the briber and bribee will get punished. The bribe will be conscated; the
civil servant will be removed from the oce, and the project from the briber will be disqualied.
4In this case, the civil servant will be removed from oce, but the private agent will not be
compensated for the unfair test.
5With a continuum of agents, the action of a single civil servant cannot aect the proportion of
the bad type in the society as a whole. In addition, as civil servants face generations of short-run
private agents and are randomly assigned for the tests at the beginning of each period, the dominant
strategy for the \opportunist" type \O" civil servants is to implement fair test regardless of bribe
oering.
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Figure 1: Stage Game Payos
(B) or not bribe (N).
Then, it is the turn for the civil servants. For a type \B" civil servant, if there
is a bribe, depending on whether the bribing behavior is escaping scot-free (E) or
detected (D) by the government, the corresponding payos for the private agent and
the civil servant are: (GR  C;W + C) if escaping scot-free; ( C; 0) if detected.
Here, G is the probability of the project being approved under a fair test. R is the
benet from an approved project. The benet from a failed project is normalized to
zero. C is the amount of bribe. W is the periodical wage of the civil servant.
If there is no bribe, she will place obstacles during the test. Depending on whether
such duty dereliction is escaping scot-free (E) or detected (D) by the government,
the corresponding payos for the private agent and the civil servant are: (BR;W )
if escaping scot-free; (BR; 0) if detected. Here, B is the probability of the project
being approved under an unfair test, in which the civil servant place obstacles.
In contrast, for a type \O" civil servant, if there is a bribe, she will weigh the
advantages and disadvantages to choose accepting or rejecting. If she accepts the
bribe, depending on escaping scot-free (E) or being detected (D), the correspond-
ing payos for the private agent and the civil servant are: (GR  C;W + C) if
escaping scot-free; ( C; 0) if detected. If she rejects, the corresponding payos are:
(GR  C;W ), where  2 (0; 1) is the share of loss on a rejected bribe. If there is
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no bribe, the corresponding payos for the private agent and the civil servant are:
(GR;W ).
2.3 Dynamic Game
Consider the game in period t. Let xt represent the mass of type \B" in the population
of civil servants at the beginning of period t. The remaining 1 xt is the mass of type
\O". Thus, fxtg represents the state of the economy in period t, which is common
knowledge. The expected payos of the private agents and the civil servants in period
t are denoted by gi;t(a1; a2j; xt) for i = 1; 2, where ai 2 Ai and  2 fB; Og. Based on
the stage game payos in section 2.2, for various combination of (a1; a2), the expected
payos (g1;t(a1; a2j; xt); g2;t(a1; a2j; xt)) are listed in the following table.
Table 1: Expected Payos of the Private Agents and the Civil Servants in Period t
(a1; a2)  = B  = O
(B;A)
((1  p;t)GR  C; (1  p;t)(W + C))
((1  p;t)GR  C; (1  p;t)(W + C))
(B;R) (GR  C;W )
(N;A)
(BR; (1  p;t)W ) (GR;W )(N;R)
Here, p;t and p;t are functions of xt. As dened earlier, p;t = minf= t; 1g,
where  t is the mass of civil servants accepting bribe in period t; p;t = minf=t; 1g,
where t is the mass of civil servants placing obstacles during the tests in period
t. Clearly, only a type \B" civil servant places obstacles if there is no bribe. Thus,
t = xt, which implies p;t = minf=xt; 1g. In contrast, if there are bribes, type \O"
civil servants may accept, in addition to the type \B". Therefore, depending on the
choice of type \O", there are two scenarios. If type \O" accepts,  t = 1 and p;t = ;
if not,  t = xt and p;t = minf=xt; 1g.6
For the long-lived civil servants, we need to consider the continuation payo in
addition to the stage payo. Assume the civil servants alive in date t remain in the
economy in date t + 1 with probability  2 (0; 1). Each quit is oset by the arrival
of a new civil servant selected by the government from a pool of candidates with
proportion of the two types \B" and \O": (f; 1   f). Hence, the size of the civil
servants remains constant mass of 1. Further, at the beginning of each period, every
civil servant will be assigned exactly one test. In each period the mass of private
agents chosen by the government to get their projects tested equals the mass of the
civil servants, which equals to one.
6For simplicity, we consider the symmetric equilibrium, in which all \opportunist" type \O" civil
servants choose the same action in any given period.
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Our solution concept is Markov Perfect Equilibrium. Consider the game at an
arbitrary period with state x.7 The (Markov) strategy of the private agent is 1 :
[0; 1] ! fB;Ng, while the strategy of the \opportunist" type \O" civil servant is
2 : [0; 1]! fA;Rg. The \opportunist" type \O" civil servant's intertemporal value
function V : [0; 1]! R is written as:
V (x) =
8>><>>:
max
n
g2(B;AjO; x) + (1  p)V (x0);
g2(B;RjO; x) + V (x00)
o
if 1(x) = B;
g2(N; a2jO; x) + V (x000) if 1(x) = N:
(1)
where x0 is the state variable after the acceptance of bribes, x00 is the state variable
after the denial of bribes, and x000 is the state variable after no bribe.
Here, the equilibrium belief of the private agents on the masses of corruptive
behaviors, bribe acceptance and duty dereliction, is the group reputation of the
civil servants. Specically, denote PA1 as the belief of the private agents about the
mass of bribe acceptance if there are bribes; denote PA2 as the belief of the private
agents about the mass of obstacle placing during the tests if there is no bribe. Given
state x, the group reputation (PA1 ; PA2) is listed in the following table, depending on
the equilibrium strategy prole (1; 2).
Table 2: Group Reputation of the Civil Servants
(1; 2) (PA1 ; PA2)
(B;A) (1; x)
(B;R) (x; x)
(N;A) (1; x)
(N;R) (x; x)
2.4 State Transition
Now, we turn to characterize the evolution of the state variable x. There are three
cases, depending on the strategy prole of the private agents and the \opportunist"
type \O" civil servants: (1; 2).
Case 1: (1; 2) = (B;A)
In this case, p = . The state of transition from x to x
0 is as follows.
x0 = (1  p)x+ [(1  ) + p]f
= (1  )x+ [(1  ) + ]f (2)
7Here, we drop the subscript t.
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Case 2: (1; 2) = (B;R)
In this case, p = minf=x; 1g. The state of transition from x to x00 is as follows.
x00 = (1  p)x+ [(1  ) + px]f
=

x  + (1  + )f if x > 
(1  + x)f if x  
(3)
Case 3: (1; 2) = (N;A) or (N;R)
In this case, p = minf=x; 1g. The state of transition from x to x000 is as follows.
x000 = (1  p)x+ [(1  ) + px]f
=

x   + (1  + )f if x > 
(1  + x)f if x  
(4)
3 Social Transformation
Now, we turn to analyze how the change of reputation matching matters during the
social transformation from community to society. First, we start with anonymous
matching, where a potential briber does not know the true type of her matching civil
servant and therefore will decide whether or not to oer a bribe according to the group
reputation of the civil servants. Then, we move on to acquaintance matching, where
a potential briber knows the true type of her matching civil servant and therefore
will decide whether or not to oer a bribe according to the private reputation of the
civil servant. Finally, we show that the regime change from acquaintance matching
in small communities to anonymous matching in complex societies tends to cause
rampant corruption.
3.1 Anonymous Matching
Consider anonymous matching, in which a private agent does not know the true
type of her matching civil servant. From the intertemporal value function of the
\opportunist" type \O" civil servant in equation 1, we have the following lemma,
which says that V (x) increases in x and is bounded below and above.
Lemma 1 V (x) increases in x and VL  V (x)  VH , where VL = 11 W and
VH =
(1 )
1 (1 )(W + C).
Obviously, if x increases, V (x) is non-decreasing, as the \opportunist" type \O"
civil servants can always copy the previous strategy adopted in the case with lower
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x and gain. Simply because now with more bad type \B", the probability of being
detected by the government is going down. In addition, regardless of the choices by
others, civil servants can guarantee the payo of VL by always rejecting bribes if there
are any, where
VL = W + VL =) VL = 1
1  W
Further, the upper bound of the payo of the civil servants VH is achieved if private
agents oer bribes and all civil servants accept and these are sustained, where
VH = (1  )[(W + C) + VH ] =) VH = (1  )
1  (1  )(W + C)
3.1.1 Equilibrium Characterization
Now, we move on to characterize the symmetric Markov Perfect Equilibrium. From
stage game payo of the private agents in table 1 and the intertemporal value function
of the \opportunist" type \O" civil servant in equation 1, the following lemma shows
the existence of a symmetric Markov Perfect Equilibrium.
Lemma 2 There exists a symmetric Markov Perfect Equilibrium, in which the strat-
egy prole (1; 2) at any given period with the state variable x is as follows.
(i) For  < A,
(1; 2) =

(B;A) if x > x
(N;A) if x  x
(ii) For   A,
(1; 2) =

(B;R) if x > x
(N;R) if x  x
where A =
1
1+ W
C(1 )
, x = C+GR
(G B)R , x
 = C+GR
(G B)R (1 )C . Note, x
 > x.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Intuitively, from lemma 1, V (x) is bounded below by VL and above by VH . It is
easy to see that if  < 1
1+ W
C(1 )
= A, VH > VL; if   A, VH  VL. Consider
the symmetric equilibrium. With a continuum of agents, the action of a single civil
servant cannot aect the proportion of the bad type in the society as a whole. In the
case of  < A, all \opportunist" type \O" civil servants accept bribes if there are any.
Simply because VH > VL and p =  is the minimum value of p, so that accepting a
bribe if there is any is the best for anyone to do. Back to the private agent's problem
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at the beginning of the period, as all \opportunist" type \O" civil servants accept
bribes if there are any, p = . From the stage game payo of the private agents in
table 1, to induce private agents not to oer bribes, x  C+GR
(G B)R = x
.
In contrast, in the case of   A, all \opportunist" type \O" civil servants
reject bribes if there is any. Simply because VH  VL, so that rejecting a bribe if
there is any is the best for anyone to get the guaranteed payo. Back to the private
agent's problem at the beginning of the period, as all \opportunist" type \O" civil
servants reject bribes if there are any, p = minf=x; 1g. From the stage game
payo of the private agents in table 1, to induce private agents not to oer bribes,
x  C+GR
(G B)R (1 )C = x
.
Further, we have x > x. The reasoning is that if  is small so that \opportunist"
type \O" civil servants accept bribes if there is any, private agents are less willing to
oer bribes. Only if the proportion of bad type \B" in the population is suciently
large, will they oer bribes.
3.1.2 Evolutionary Dynamics
After characterizing the equilibrium, the natural extension is to analyze the evolu-
tionary dynamics in the long run. There are four possible steady states, depending
on the strategy prole of the private agents and the \opportunist" type \O" civil
servants: (1; 2).
High Corruption Steady State (HCSS): (1; 2) = (B;A)
From equation 2, we can derive a steady state, in which the private agents al-
ways oer bribes and the type \O" civil servants accept bribes. The corresponding
proportion of \bad" type \B" civil servant is
fH = f
We designate such state as High Corruption Steady State (HCSS).
Low Corruption Steady State I (LCSS-I): (1; 2) = (B;R)
From equation 3, we can derive a steady state, in which the private agents al-
ways oer bribes and the type \O" civil servants reject bribes. The corresponding
proportion of \bad" type \B" civil servant is
fI =

(1 )f (1 f)
1  if  < f
f if   f
where f = (1 )f
1 f . Note, fI  f . We designate such state as Low Corruption Steady
State I (LCSS-I).
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Low Corruption Steady State II (LCSS-II): (1; 2) = (N;A)
From equation 4, we can derive a steady state, in which the private agents do not
oer any bribe and the type \O" civil servants would accept a bribe if there were any.
The corresponding proportion of \bad" type \B" civil servant is
fII =

(1 )f (1 f)
1  if  < f
f if   f
Note, fII  f . We designate such state as Low Corruption Steady State II (LCSS-II).
Low Corruption Steady State III (LCSS-III): (1; 2) = (N;R)
From equation 4, we can derive one more steady state, in which the private agents
do not oer any bribe and the type \O" civil servants would not accept a bribe if
there were any. As there is no bribe from the private agents, the proportion of \bad"
type \B" civil servant is the same as the proportion in the LCSS-II, fII . We designate
such state as Low Corruption Steady State III (LCSS-III).
Figure 2 illustrates the proportion of \bad" type \B" civil servants at these four
steady states as functions of , given the value of . Similarly, we may draw the
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.
The following lemma shows the feasible conditions of the four steady states above.
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Lemma 3 HCSS is feasible if  < H ;
LCSS-I is feasible if I >   A;
LCSS-II is feasible if A >   II ;
LCSS-III is feasible if   III ;
where
H = min

f(G   B)R  C
GR
;A

I = min
(
f [(G   B)R  (1  )C]  C
GR+
(1 f)
1  [(G   B)R  (1  )C]
; f
)
II =
8<:
(1 )f (1 f)
1  (G B)R C
GR
if  < f
f(G B)R C
GR
if   f
III =
8><>: max

(1 )f (1 f)
1  [(G B)R (1 )C] C
GR
; A

if  < f
max
n
f [(G B)R (1 )C] C
GR
; A
o
if   f
Proof. See the Appendix.
Figure 3 sketches out space partition of the states when H < A. Figure 4
sketches out the state space partition when H = A. There are some more minor
variations of state space partitions depending on the values of parameters. But the
basic shapes are as described in gures 3 and 4. Generally speaking, if the govern-
mental supervision eort level against the corruptive behavior of bribe acceptance 
is low, HCSS is feasible; if  is high, LCSS-III is feasible; if  is in the middle, LCSS-I
or LCSS-II may be feasible.
In the long run, the economy at any arbitrary state xt may evolve into some steady
state. The following lemma shows that when  is small, xt will converge to fH or
fI , or oscillate around x
; when  is large, xt will converge to fI or fII , or oscillate
around x.
Lemma 4 Suppose in period t the economy is at some state xt. There are two sce-
narios for the transition of state in the long run.
(i) If  < A, xt will converge to fH or fII , or oscillate around x
. In particular,
if  < minfII ; Hg, xt will converge to fH . If maxfII ; Hg   < A, xt will
converge to fII . If II   < H , there are two subcases: if xt > x, it will converge
to fH ; if xt  x, it will converge to fII . If H   < minfII ; Ag, xt will oscillate
around x.
(ii) If   A, xt will converge to fI or fII , or oscillate around x. In particular,
if   III , xt will converge to fII . If I >   A, xt will converge to fI . If
III >   maxfA; Ig, xt will oscillate around x.
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Figure 3: The State Space Partition: H < A
Proof. See the Appendix.
3.2 Acquaintance Matching
Consider acquaintance matching, in which a private agent knows the true type of her
matching civil servant.8 From stage game payos of the private agents in table 1, if
a civil servant is the \opportunist" type \O", the best response for the private agent
is to \not bribe," as the \opportunist" type \O" civil servant will always implement
a fair test. In this case, the \opportunist" type \O" civil servant is passive and there
is no loss of bribe. The following lemma shows the existence of a symmetric Markov
Perfect Equilibrium.
Lemma 5 There exists a symmetric Markov Perfect Equilibrium, in which the strat-
egy 1 at any given period with the state variable x is as follows.
1 =

B if x > ex
N if x  ex
where ex = GR
(G B)R C . Note, x
 > x > ex.
8Still, the government does not know the true type of a civil servant.
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H = A
Proof. See the Appendix.
3.2.1 Evolutionary Dynamics
After characterizing the equilibrium, we move on to analyze the evolutionary dynam-
ics in the long run. There are two possible steady states, depending on the strategy
of the private agents: 1.
Low Corruption Steady State I0 (LCSS-I0): 1 = B
From equation 3, we can derive a steady state, in which the private agents oer
bribes to the type \B" civil servants. The corresponding proportion of \bad" type
\B" civil servant is the same as the proportion in the LCSS-I, fI . We designate such
state as Low Corruption Steady State I0 (LCSS-I0).
Low Corruption Steady State II0 (LCSS-II0): 1 = N
From equation 4, we can derive a steady state, in which the private agents do
not oer any bribe to the type \B" civil servants. The corresponding proportion of
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\bad" type \B" civil servant is the same as the proportion in the LCSS-II, fII . We
designate such state as Low Corruption Steady State II0 (LCSS-II0).
The following lemma shows the feasible conditions of the two steady states above.
Lemma 6 LCSS-I0 is feasible if  < 0I ;
LCSS-II0 is feasible if   II ;
where
0I = min
(
f [(G   B)R  C]
GR+
(1 f)
1  [(G   B)R  C]
; f
)
II =
8<:
(1 )f (1 f)
1  [(G B)R C]
GR
if  < f
f [(G B)R C]
GR
if   f
Proof. See the Appendix.
Figure 5 sketches out the state space partition. Generally speaking, if the govern-
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Figure 5: The State Space Partition: Acquaintance Matching
mental supervision eort level against bribe acceptance  is low, LCSS-I0 is feasible;
if  is high, LCSS-II0 is feasible.
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In the long run, the economy at any arbitrary state xt may evolve into some steady
state. The following lemma shows that when  is small, xt will converge to fI ; when
 is large, xt will converge to fII ; when  is in the middle, xt will converge to fI or
fII , or oscillate around ex.
Lemma 7 Suppose in period t the economy is at some state xt. xt will converge to
fI or fII , or oscillate around ex. In particular, if  < minf0I ; IIg, xt will converge
to fI . If   maxf0I ; IIg, xt will converge to fII . If 0I >   II , there are two
subcases: if xt > ex, it will converge to fI ; if xt  ex, it will converge to fII . If
II >   0I , xt will oscillate around ex.
Proof. See the Appendix.
3.3 Acquaintance Matching to Anonymous Matching { the
Rampancy of Corruption
Consider the regime change from acquaintance matching to anonymous matching.
The transformation from community to society, as in Tonnies (2001) and Cook and
Hardin (2001), may change the way of interaction among individuals. In particular,
originally a private agent knows the true type of her matching civil servant. Now
with the enlarged group, the true type of the matching civil servant is unknown and
the decision to bribe or not to bribe will be made according to the current group
reputation of the civil servants.
The following proposition shows that the regime change from acquaintance match-
ing in small communities to anonymous matching in complex societies tends to cause
rampant corruption, if the governmental supervision eort level against the corruptive
behavior of bribe acceptance  is small.
Proposition 1 Suppose there is a regime change from acquaintance matching to
anonymous matching at the beginning of period t. If  < minfII ; Hg, xt will
converge to fH .
Intuitively, under acquaintance matching, by lemma 7, xt will converge to fI or fII ,
or oscillate around ex. Suppose there is a regime change from acquaintance matching
to anonymous matching at the beginning of period t. By lemma 4, xt will converge
to fH , if  < minfII ; Hg. Therefore, there will be a rampancy of corruption.
4 Anti-Corruption
The regime change of reputation matching has signicant policy implications. From
lemma 4 and 7, we know in the long run the state variable will converge to either
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fH , fI or fII , or oscillate around x
, x or ex. Accordingly, we dene the levels of
corruption as follows.
The economy in some period t is at the high level of corruption if
x = fH for all   t.
The economy in some period t is at the mid-level of corruption if x
oscillates around x for all   t.
The economy in some period t is at the low level of corruption if
x = fI or fII , or oscillates around x
 or ex for all   t.
Suppose currently the economy is at the high level or mid-level of corruption.
The government introduces some anti-corruption policy, i.e., adjusting the level of
supervision eort f; g, aiming to lead to the low level of corruption. There are
two types of anti-corruption policy. The rst is permanent, in which the government
exerts a new level of supervision eort f; g staring from the current period and
it lasts forever. The second is transitional, one-time policy, in which the government
exerts a new level of supervision eort ft; tg in the current period t. And it only
lasts one period. After period t, the supervision eort goes back to the original level.
Now, we turn to discuss the two types of anti-corruption policy for the high level and
mid-level corruption respectively.
4.1 Permanent Anti-Corruption Policy
The following proposition shows that to reverse the high or mid-level of corruption,
for the permanent anti-corruption policy,  must exceed some minimum level, which
is a decreasing function of .
Proposition 2 Suppose in period t the economy is at the high or mid-level corrup-
tion. The government introduces a permanent anti-corruption policy, i.e., perma-
nently adjusting the level of supervision eort from f; g to f; g starting from
period t. To reverse the high or mid-level of corruption,  must be greater than or
equal to maxfH ;minfII ; Agg, which is a decreasing function of .
Intuitively, by lemma 4, if   A, xt will converge to fI or fII , or oscillate around
x. In addition, in the case of  < A, if maxfII ; Hg   < A, xt will converge
to fII . Combining these, as long as 
  maxfH ;minfII ; Agg, xt will evolve to
the low level of corruption. In addition, as II decreases in  and both H and A
are independent of , maxfH ;minfII ; Agg decreases in .
In addition, by lemma 4, the eectiveness of the permanent anti-corruption policy
is not monotonic with respect to f; g, as described in the following proposition.
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Proposition 3 The eectiveness of a permanent anti-corruption policy is not mono-
tonic with respect to f; g. In particular, we have the following scenarios.
(i) If maxfII ; Hg   < A, xt will converge to fII , which is a decreasing
function of .
(ii) If I > 
  A, xt will converge to fI , which is a decreasing function of
. In this case,  is irrelevant.
(iii) If III > 
  maxfA; Ig, xt will oscillate around x.
(iv) If   III , xt will converge to fII , which is a decreasing function of .
In this case, increasing  further does not help.
In particular, as  reaches the minimum threshold, we could end up with some
lower level corruption, which is a decreasing function of . But further increasing of
 may not help till to some point before which the level of corruption is a decreasing
function of . Thereafter, if  increases further, the level of corruption could be
even higher. Finally, if  is suciently large, to increase  becomes futile and the
level of corruption depends on . In this sense, anti-corruption measures have to be
taken on both lines of bribe taking and duty dereliction.
Moreover, from proposition 3, it is easy to see that it is no use to set the supervision
eort greater than some upper limit.
Corollary 1   III and   f .
4.2 One Time Anti-Corruption Policy
If the government adopts a one time anti-corruption policy, the following proposition
says that most likely it will only have temporary eects. Once the supervision eort
goes back to its original level, the corruption level will converge back to fH or oscillate
around x from lemma 4. Only under some special circumstance, a one time anti-
corruption policy can overturn the high level of corruption.
Proposition 4 Suppose in period t the economy is at the high or mid-level of cor-
ruption The government introduces a one time anti-corruption policy, i.e., exerting a
new level of supervision eort ft; tg in the current period t. And it only lasts one
period. After period t, the supervision eort goes back to the original level. There are
two scenarios as follows.
(i) If  < minfII ; Hg or H   < minfII ; Ag, there is no one time anti-
corruption policy to eectively reverse the high or mid-level of corruption.
(ii) If II   < H and f x(1 f)  f , then the one time anti-corruption policy
will overturn the high level corruption, as long as t  maxfA; f x(1 f)g.
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Proof. See the Appendix.
5 Discussion
In this section, we discuss the comparative statics of the discount factor  and the
survival rate . By lemmas 3 and 6, we have the following proposition: if the civil
servants are more impatient, i.e.  and  decrease, the economy is more likely to end
up with the high level of corruption. Even if the economy stays in the low level of
corruption, the corresponding degree of corruption is higher. Further, by proposition
2, the corresponding threshold for permanent anti-corruption policy also shifts up.
Proposition 5 (i) f , fI , fII decrease in . In particular, as ! 0, f , fI , fII ! f ;
as ! 1, f , fI , fII ! 0.
(ii) A, H , I , II , III , 
0
I decrease in  and . In particular, as ! 1, A,
H , I , II , III , 
0
I ! 0.
(iii) ,  decrease in  and . In particular, as ! 1, ,  ! 0.
6 Conclusion
This paper presents a model of group reputation formation and evolution, illustrated
by a corruption case, in the context of social transformation. A player's group rep-
utation is dened as others' beliefs on the characteristics of her aliated group. We
characterize the symmetric Markov Perfect Equilibrium of the model and analyze
the evolutionary dynamics of the equilibrium in the long-run for both anonymous
reputation matching and acquaintance reputation matching.
We show that the regime change from acquaintance matching in small communities
to anonymous matching in complex societies tends to cause rampant corruption. This
supports the idea that the transformation from community to society may change the
way of interaction among individuals (Tonnies 2001; Cook and Hardin 2001).
Finally, we show that the eectiveness of an anti-corruption policy is non-monotonic
with respect to the supervision eorts, which have to reach some long-term minimum
level to reverse high corruption. To be eective, anti-corruption measures have to be
taken on both lines of bribe acceptance and duty dereliction.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 2
Suppose we are currently at some period with state x. By backward induction, consider the
\opportunist" type \O" civil servant's problem: to reject or accept a bribe if there is any.
Consider the symmetric equilibrium, either all \opportunist" type \O" civil servants reject
bribes if there are any or all accept. From lemma 1, VL  V (x)  VH , where VL = 11 W
and VH =
(1 )
1 (1 )(W + C). It is easy to see that if  <
1
1+ W
C(1 )
= A, VH > VL; if
  A, VH  VL. Let us discuss these two scenarios one by one.
(i)  < A
Suppose currently all \opportunist" type \O" civil servants accept bribes if there are any,
in which p = . Let us check if there is incentive to deviate. With a continuum of agents,
the action of a single civil servant cannot aect the proportion of the bad type in the society
as a whole. By the one-shot deviation principle, there is no incentive for any individual
\opportunist" type \O" civil servant to deviate unilaterally, as long as (1 )[(W+C)] W ,
which implies   1
1+W
C
. Since A =
1
1+ W
C(1 )
< 1
1+W
C
, this condition is satised. As for
the coalition deviation, again there is no incentive for the \opportunist" type \O" civil
servants to deviate. Simply because VH > VL and p =  is the minimum value of p, so
that accepting a bribe if there is any is the best for anyone to do.
Back to the private agent's problem at the beginning of the period, as all \opportunist"
type \O" civil servants accept bribes if there are any, p = . From stage game payos of
private agents in table 1, to induce private agents not to oer bribes9
xBR+ (1  x)GR  (1  )GR  C (5)
which implies
x  C + GR
(G   B)R = x

(ii)   A
Suppose currently all \opportunist" type \O" civil servants reject bribes if there are
any, in which p = minf=x; 1g. Let us check if there is incentive to deviate. Again, with a
continuum of agents, the action of a single civil servant cannot aect the proportion of the
bad type in the society as a whole. By the one-shot deviation principle, there is no incentive
for any individual \opportunist" type \O" civil servant to deviate unilaterally, as long as
(1   p)[(W + C) +  W1  ]  W1  , which implies p  A. Depending on x, if x  ,
9Again, we consider the symmetric equilibrium, either every or no private agent oers bribe.
With a continuum of civil servants, the action of a single private agent cannot aect the proportion
of the bad type in the society as a whole. Same logic, there is no gain from unilateral deviation.
Obviously, if you are the only one oering a bribe, then for sure you will be caught. In addition,
there is no gain from any coalition deviation.
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p = 1, which is greater than A. If x > , p = =x, which is greater than or equal to A
as   A. As for the coalition deviation, again there is no incentive for the \opportunist"
type \O" civil servants to deviate. Simply because VH  VL, so that rejecting a bribe if
there is any is the best for anyone to get the guaranteed payo.
Back to the private agent's problem at the beginning of the period, as all \opportunist"
type \O" civil servants reject bribes if there are any, p = minf=x; 1g. From stage game
payos of private agents in table 1, to induce private agents not to oer bribes
xBR+ (1  x)GR  x[(1  p)GR  C] + (1  x)[GR  C] (6)
If x  , p = 1. The condition above becomes
xBR+ (1  x)GR  x[ C] + (1  x)[GR  C]
which always holds.
If x > , p = =x. The condition above becomes
xBR+ (1  x)GR  x[(1  =x)GR  C] + (1  x)[GR  C]
which implies
x  C + GR
(G   B)R  (1  )C = x

Note, x > . Combining the two cases above, if x  x, a private agent will not oer
a bribe at the beginning of the period.
Further, from the no bribe condition in 5 and 6, as x! 1, it becomes
BR  (1  )GR  C
That is to say, if the condition above is satised, the gain from \bribing" is denitely less
than or equal to the cost and therefore the private agents will for sure have no incentive
to oer a bribe, no matter how large x is. To exclude this degeneracy case, we assume
BR < (1  )GR  C. Given this, it is easy to check that x > x.
Proof of Lemma 3
Feasible Conditions of HCSS:
At HCSS, (1; 2) = (B;A). The corresponding proportion of \bad" type \B" civil
servant is fH = f . From lemma 2, if  < A =
1
1+ W
C(1 )
, an \opportunist" type \O" civil
servant will accept a bribe if there is any. Back to the private agent's problem, to induce a
private agent to oer a bribe,
fH >
C + GR
(G   B)R = x

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These imply that if  < H = min
n
f(G B)R C
GR
; A
o
, HCSS is feasible. Note that
H  A.
Feasible Conditions of LCSS-I:
At LCSS-I, (1; 2) = (B;R). The corresponding proportion of \bad" type \B" civil
servant is
fI =
(
(1 )f (1 f)
1  if  < f
f if   f
From lemma 2, if   A = 11+ W
C(1 )
, an \opportunist" type \O" civil servant will reject
a bribe if there is any. Back to the private agent's problem, to induce a private agent to
oer a bribe,
fI >
C + GR
(G   B)R  (1  )C = x

There are two subcases depending on the value of .
If   f , fI = f  . The condition above becomes
f >
C + GR
(G   B)R  (1  )C
which does not hold.
If  < f , fI =
(1 )f (1 f)
1   f > . The condition above becomes
(1  )f   (1  f)
1   >
C + GR
(G   B)R  (1  )C
which implies  < f [(G B)R (1 )C] C
GR+
(1 f)
1  [(G B)R (1 )C]
.
Combining these two subcases, we have the feasible conditions of LCSS-I as follows.
min
(
f [(G   B)R  (1  )C]  C
GR+
(1 f)
1  [(G   B)R  (1  )C]
; f
)
= I >   A = 1
1 + WC(1 )
Feasible Conditions of LCSS-II:
At LCSS-II, (1; 2) = (N;A). The corresponding proportion of \bad" type \B" civil
servant is
fII =
(
(1 )f (1 f)
1  if  < f
f if   f
From lemma 2, if  < A =
1
1+ W
C(1 )
, an \opportunist" type \O" civil servant will accept
a bribe if there is any. Back to the private agent's problem, to induce a private agent not
to oer a bribe,
fII  C + GR
(G   B)R = x

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There are two subcases depending on the value of .
If   f , fI = f . The condition above becomes
f  C + GR
(G   B)R = x

which implies   f(G B)R CGR .
If  < f , fI =
(1 )f (1 f)
1  . The condition above becomes
(1  )f   (1  f)
1   
C + GR
(G   B)R
which implies  
(1 )f (1 f)
1  (G B)R C
GR
.
Note that when  = f , (1 )f (1 f)1  = f . Combining these two subcases, we have the
feasible conditions of LCSS-II as follows.
1
1 + WC(1 )
= A >   II =
8<:
(1 )f (1 f)
1  (G B)R C
GR
if  < f
f(G B)R C
GR
if   f
Feasible Conditions of LCSS-III:
At LCSS-III, (1; 2) = (N;R). The corresponding proportion of \bad" type \B" civil
servant is
fII =
(
(1 )f (1 f)
1  if  < f
f if   f
From lemma 2, if   A = 11+ W
C(1 )
, an \opportunist" type \O" civil servant will reject
a bribe if there is any. Back to the private agent's problem, to induce a private agent not
to oer a bribe,
fII  C + GR
(G   B)R  (1  )C = x

There are two subcases depending on the value of .
If   f , fI = f . The condition above becomes
f  C + GR
(G   B)R  (1  )C
which implies   f [(G B)R (1 )C] CGR .
If  < f , fI =
(1 )f (1 f)
1  . The condition above becomes
(1  )f   (1  f)
1   
C + GR
(G   B)R  (1  )C
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which implies  
(1 )f (1 f)
1  [(G B)R (1 )C] C
GR
.
Note that when  = f , (1 )f (1 f)1  = f . Combining these two subcases, we have the
feasible conditions of LCSS-III as follows.
  III =
8><>: max

(1 )f (1 f)
1  [(G B)R (1 )C] C
GR
; A

if  < f
max
n
f [(G B)R (1 )C] C
GR
; A
o
if   f
Note that A  III , I < III , and II < III . I.e., maxfA; I ; IIg  III .
Proof of Lemma 4
Following lemma 2, there are two scenarios for the transition of state in the long run.
(i)  < A
In this case, all \opportunist" type \O" civil servants accept bribes if there are any.
Further, if xt > x
, a private agent will oer a bribe at the beginning of period t. The
transition of the state of the economy from period t to period t+1 follows equation 2. Since
(1   ) is less than 1, xt+1 < xt if xt > fH ; xt+1 > xt if xt < fH ; xt+1 = xt = fH if
xt = fH . Thus, xt will monotonically converge to fH , if HCSS is feasible.
In contrast, if xt  x, a private agent will not oer a bribe at the beginning of period
t. The transition of the state of the economy from period t to period t+1 follows equation
4. Same argument, since both  and f are less than 1, xt+1 < xt if xt > fII ; xt+1 > xt
if xt < fII ; xt+1 = xt = fII if xt = fII . Thus, xt will monotonically converge to fII , if
LCSS-II is feasible.
Back to lemma 3, HCSS is feasible if  < H ; LCSS-II is feasible if A >   II ; and
H  A. Therefore, if  < minfII ; Hg, only HCSS is feasible and xt will converge to
fH .
10 If maxfII ; Hg   < A, only LCSS-II is feasible and xt will converge to fII . If
II   < H , both HCSS and LCSS-II are feasible. There are two subcases: if xt > x, it
will converge to fH ; if xt  x, it will converge to fII . If H   < minfII ; Ag, neither
HCSS nor LCSS-II is feasible and xt will oscillate around x
.
(i)   A
In this case, all \opportunist" type \O" civil servants reject bribes if there are any.
Further, if xt > x
, a private agent will oer a bribe at the beginning of period t. The
transition of the state of the economy from period t to period t+1 follows equation 3. Since
both  and f are less than 1, xt+1 < xt if xt > fI ; xt+1 > xt if xt < fI ; xt+1 = xt = fI if
xt = fI . Thus, xt will monotonically converge to fI , if LCSS-I is feasible.
In contrast, if xt  x, a private agent will not oer a bribe at the beginning of period
t. The transition of the state of the economy from period t to period t+1 follows equation
10xt may not directly converge to fH . If xt  x, it will converge to fII following equation 4.
Since LCSS-II is not feasible in this case, fII > x
, once at some  , x > x, it will be back to the
track of converging to fH directly following equation 2. Similar argument apply to the cases follow.
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4. Since both  and f are less than 1, xt+1 < xt if xt > fII ; xt+1 > xt if xt < fII ;
xt+1 = xt = fII if xt = fII . Thus, xt will monotonically converge to fII , if LCSS-III is
feasible.
Back to lemma 3, LCSS-I is feasible if I >   A; LCSS-III is feasible if   III .
In addition, A  III and I < III . Therefore, we have three disjoint areas: if   III ,
only LCSS-III is feasible and xt will converge to fII ; if I >   A, only LCSS-I is feasible
and xt will converge to fI ; if III >   maxfA; Ig, neither LCSS-I nor LCSS-III is
feasible and xt will oscillate around x
.
Proof of Lemma 5
Suppose in period t the economy is at some state xt. Under acquaintance matching, a
private agent knows the true type of her matching civil servant. From stage game payos
of private agents in table 1, if the matching civil servant is the \opportunist" type \O", the
best response for the private agent is to \not bribe," as a type \O" civil servant will always
implement a fair test. In this case, type \O" civil servants are passive and there is no loss
of bribe.
In contrast, if the matching civil servant is the bad type \B", the private agent will not
oer a bribe whenever
BR  (1  p)GR  C (7)
where p = minf=x; 1g.
If x  , p = 1. The condition above becomes
BR  (1  1)GR  C
which always holds.
If x > , p = =x. The condition above becomes
BR  (1  
x
)GR  C
which implies
x  GR
(G   B)R  C = ex
Note, ex > . Combining the two cases above, if x  ex, a private agent will not oer a
bribe to the bad type \B" civil servant at the beginning of the period. Note, x > x > ex.
Proof of Lemma 6
Feasible Conditions of LCSS-I0:
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At LCSS-I0, the private agents oer bribes to the bad type \B" civil servants. By
equation 3, we can derive the proportion of \bad" type \B" civil servant at LCSS-I0, which
is the same as the proportion in the LCSS-I, fI .
fI =
(
(1 )f (1 f)
1  if  < f
f if   f
Back to inequality 7, to induce a private agent to oer a bribe to the bad type \B" civil
servant, the following condition must hold.
BR < (1  p)GR  C (8)
where p = minf=x; 1g.
At LCSS-I0,
p =

=fI if  < fI
1 if   fI
There are two subcases depending on the value of .
If   f , fI = f   and p = 1. The condition in (8) becomes
BR < (1  1)GR  C
which does not hold.
If  < f , fI =
(1 )f (1 f)
1   f >  and p = =fI . The condition in (8) becomes
BR < (1  
fI
)GR  C
Thus, we have
fI >
GR
(G   B)R  C
which implies  < f [(G B)R C]
GR+
(1 f)
1  [(G B)R C]
.
Combining these two subcases, we have the feasible condition of LCSS-I0 as follows.
 < 0I = min
(
f [(G   B)R  C]
GR+
(1 f)
1  [(G   B)R  C]
; f
)
Note that 0I  I .
Feasible Conditions of LCSS-II0:
At LCSS-II0, the private agents do not oer bribes to the bad type \B" civil servants.
By equation 4, we can derive the proportion of \bad" type \B" civil servant at LCSS-II0,
which is the same as the proportion in the LCSS-II, fII .
fII =
(
(1 )f (1 f)
1  if  < f
f if   f
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Back to inequality 7, to induce a private agent not to oer a bribe, the following condition
must hold.
BR  (1  p)GR  C (9)
where p = minf=x; 1g.
At LCSS-II0,
p =

=fII if  < fII
1 if   fII
There are four subcases depending on the value of  and .
(i)   f and   fII :
If   f , fII = f . Further, if   fII = f , p = 1. The condition in (9) becomes
BR  (1  1)GR  C
which always holds.
(ii)  < f and   fII :
If  < f , fII =
(1 )f (1 f)
1  . Further, if   fII = (1 )f (1 f)1  , p = 1. The
condition in (9) becomes
BR  (1  1)GR  C
which always holds.
(iii)   f and  < fII :
If   f , fII = f . Further, if  < fII = f , p = =fII = =f . The condition in (9)
becomes
BR  (1  
f
)GR  C
which implies   f [(G B)R C]GR .
(iv)  < f and  < fII :
If  < f , fII =
(1 )f (1 f)
1  . Further, if  < fII =
(1 )f (1 f)
1  , p = =fII . The
two conditions in (9) become
BR  (1  
fII
)GR  C
which implies  
(1 )f (1 f)
1  [(G B)R C]
GR
.
Note that when  = f , (1 )f (1 f)1  = f . Combining these four subcases, we have
the feasible conditions of LCSS-II0 as follows.
  II =
8<:
(1 )f (1 f)
1  [(G B)R C]
GR
if  < f
f [(G B)R C]
GR
if   f
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Proof of Lemma 7
Following lemma 5, if xt > ex, a private agent will oer a bribe to the bad type \B" civil
servant at the beginning of period t. The transition of the state of the economy from period
t to period t + 1 follows equation 3. Since both  and f are less than 1, xt+1 < xt if
xt > fI ; xt+1 > xt if xt < fI ; xt+1 = xt = fI if xt = fI . Thus, xt will monotonically
converge to fI , if LCSS-I
0 is feasible.
If xt  ex, a private agent will not oer a bribe to the bad type \B" civil servant at the
beginning of period t. The transition of the state of the economy from period t to period
t + 1 follows equation 4. Same argument, since both  and f are less than 1, xt+1 < xt
if xt > fII ; xt+1 > xt if xt < fII ; xt+1 = xt = fII if xt = fII . Thus, xt will monotonically
converge to fII , if LCSS-II
0 is feasible.
Back to lemma 6, LCSS-I0 is feasible if  < 0I ; LCSS-II
0 is feasible if   II . Therefore,
if  < minf0I ; IIg, only LCSS-I0 is feasible and xt will converge to fI . If   maxf0I ; IIg,
only LCSS-II0 is feasible and xt will converge to fII . If 0I >   II , both LCSS-I0 and
LCSS-II0 are feasible. There are two subcases: if xt > ex, it will converge to fI ; if xt  ex,
it will converge to fII . If II >   0I , neither LCSS-I0 nor LCSS-II0 is feasible and xt will
oscillate around ex.
Proof of Proposition 4
If the economy in period t is currently at the high level of corruption, by the feasible
condition in lemma 3,  < H . There are two scenarios:  < minfII ; Hg or II   <
H . For the rst scenario,  < minfII ; Hg, by lemma 4, the state variable will converge
to fH once the supervision eort goes back to the original level. Therefore, there is no one
time anti-corruption policy to eectively reverse the high level of corruption in this case.
For the second scenario, II   < H , by lemma 4, once the supervision eort goes
back to the original level, there are two subcases depending on the value of xt+1: if xt+1 > x
,
it will converge to fH ; if xt+1  x, it will converge to fII . Therefore, to reverse the high
level of corruption, for the one time anti-corruption policy, we need to set ft; tg in period
t, such that xt+1  x.
Let's see the state transition from xt to xt+1 given ft; tg. By lemma 2, for t < A,
given xt = fH > x
, the equilibrium strategy prole in period t (1; 2) = (B;A) and the
state of transition from xt to xt+1 follows equation 2, which yields xt+1 = fH > x
. For
t  A, given xt = fH > x, the equilibrium strategy prole in period t (1; 2) = (B;R)
and the state of transition from xt to xt+1 follow equation 3, which yields
xt+1 = (1  p;t)xt + [(1  ) + p;txt]f
=

xt   t + (1  + t)f if xt > t
(1  + xt)f if xt  t
Given xt = fH = f ,
xt+1 =

f   t + (1  + t)f if f > t
(1  + f)f if f  t
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Therefore, to fulll xt+1  x, the equation above implies t  f x(1 f) for t  f .
In addition, t  A. Combining all these, if II   < H and f x(1 f)  f , then
the one time anti-corruption policy will overturn the high level of corruption, as long as
t  maxfA; f x(1 f)g.
In addition, if the economy in period t is at the mid-level of corruption, by the feasible
condition in lemma 4, H   < minfII ; Ag. Similar to the case of  < minfII ; Hg,
by lemma 4, the state variable will oscillate around x once the supervision eort goes back
to the original level. Therefore, there is no one time anti-corruption policy to eectively
reverse the mid-level of corruption.
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